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Abstract 
As many Western countries emerged from initial periods of lockdown in spring 2020, they 
had brought COVID-19 infection rates down significantly. This was followed, however, 
with more drastic second and third waves of viral spread, which many of these same 
countries are struggling to bring under control, even with the implementation of further 
periods of lockdown. Could this have been prevented by policymakers? We revisit two 
strategies that were focus of much discussion during the early stages of the pandemic, and 
which were implemented in several Western countries, albeit in a weakened form. These 
strategies both proceed by targeting certain segments of the population, while allowing 
others to go about their lives unhindered. The first suggests selectively isolating those that 
would most likely suffer severe adverse effects if infected – in particular the elderly. The 
second involves identifying and quarantining those who are likely to be infected through a 
contact tracing app that would centrally store users’ information. We suggest that both 
strategies showed promise in preventing the need for further lockdowns, albeit in a 
significantly more stringent form than anything that was implemented in Western 
countries. We then proceed to an ethical evaluation of these more stringent policies. We 
contend that selective isolation strategies face severe ethical problems due to its 
discriminatory nature, while the ethical issues with a more aggressive contact tracing regime 
can be mitigated. This analysis has implications for how to respond effectively and ethically 
to future pandemics, and perhaps contains lessons on how to successfully emerge from our 
current predicament.  
Keywords. COVID-19; lockdown; contact tracing; selective isolation; discrimination; 
privacy 
1 Introduction 
Philosophers are increasingly scrutinizing whether, or under what circumstances, lockdown 
policies can be justified in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Broadbent and 
Smart 2020, Godfrey-Smith 2020, Winsberg et al. 2020, van Basshuysen and White 2021). 
In this paper, we consider an important question that is complementary to this line of 
inquiry: what measures should have been implemented in order to emerge safely from 
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lockdowns and avoid the need for further lockdowns? Many countries, especially in Europe 
and North America, have failed to put in place safe exit strategies. One year after the first 
wave of COVID-19 in spring 2020, in which these countries attempted to prevent their 
healthcare systems from becoming overwhelmed by instituting general lockdowns, many 
countries worldwide are facing severe waves of COVID-19, with cases having exploded to 
many times the level of their initial peak in April 2020, especially in the US (JHU 2021) and 
in many European countries (ECDC 2020). Due to the dire economic and other 
consequences of such measures, many European and US leaders were extremely reluctant 
to return to lockdown conditions, but did so after long delays and a desperate scramble to 
find viable alternatives (Beneke 2020; Ho and Pengelly 2020). 
 
Was there any way that policymakers could have avoided this situation? Could we have 
emerged from an initial lockdown with measures in place to control infection rates in a 
sustained manner, preventing further spikes and lockdowns? We revisit two strategies that 
attracted sustained attention and discussion during the early stages of the pandemic, and 
that were implemented in several Western countries in weakened forms. Both propose that 
the need for further general lockdowns could have been avoided by refocusing our 
attention on a certain segment of the population, and isolating these segments in a targeted 
fashion, while allowing others to continue their lives unhindered. The first is a selective 
isolation strategy, which involves identifying the segments of the population that are 
particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 (that is, the population that is most likely to be 
severely adversely affected by infection, and is thus more likely to require hospitalization), 
as well as those that are in close contact with that group, and increasing the restrictions on 
these groups, while relaxing restrictions on others (van Bunnik et al. 2020). The second is a 
digital contact-tracing app, with the ability to quickly identify those that have been in 
contact with possible carriers of the virus (and are thus most likely to pass the infection 
onto others), and put them into temporary quarantine (Ferretti et al. 2020).  
 
Both of these broad measures were implemented in various countries during or after the 
first wave of the pandemic, but failed to have the kind of sustained impact initially 
anticipated by both public discussion and mathematical modelling. We first sketch out each 
of these options, considering the initial evidence, based on mathematical modelling, for the 
impact of these policies, and suggesting that each must be implemented in a more stringent 
form than what we have seen in practice to live up to this promise. But the potential 
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efficacy of these policies does not settle the question of whether they should have been 
enacted, as each raises potential ethical concerns. We thus turn to an appraisal of the 
benefits and drawbacks of each option, by considering two ethically significant ways in 
which these strategies differ.  
 
First, we show that the manner in which segments of the population are targeted for 
isolation differs in an ethically significant way between the strategies. Selective isolation 
relies on group membership in determining who should be locked down, which, we argue, 
constitutes problematic discrimination against the elderly and other vulnerable groups. By 
relying on individual characteristics, a contact-tracing app is not subject to the same 
concern. While the individuals targeted for quarantine by the app might correlate with 
certain groups, and potentially result in indirect discrimination, we argue that this should be 
attributed to, and can best be ameliorated by, focusing on the background conditions that 
may lead to unjust infection patterns, rather than contact tracing. However, the focus on 
individuals brings with it its own ethical problems; namely, the tracking of individuals raises 
potential privacy concerns. We consider these issues, and argue that they can be mitigated. 
 
We will then explore the ethical implications of the aims of each strategy. Selective isolation 
is often defended on the grounds that it benefits the individuals subjected to lockdown by 
protecting them from the adverse consequences of severe infection. We suggest that this 
defense is problematic for two reasons: it is not clear that isolation is indeed to the benefit 
of those isolated, and this means of justification exacerbates the discriminatory nature of 
this strategy. Finally, we draw out some implications concerning the ethical permissibility of 
each strategy, arguing that the contact-tracing strategy is ethically preferable to selective 
isolation and that there was a strong case for instituting it in the wake of initial lockdown 
measures. 
2 Alternatives: selective isolation vs. contact tracing 
2.1 What won’t work 
Before we proceed to the ethical assessment of selective isolation and contact tracing, we 
should explain why, in the absence of a vaccine and effective treatment of COVID-19, 
these measures were regarded by many as the most promising means of avoiding the need 
for general lockdowns. Several other options for controlling the growth rate of infection 
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were proposed or implemented, but there was reason to doubt that each on its own, 
constituted an effective means of infection control: 
 
There is evidence, both empirical and based on mathematical modelling, that the wearing 
of cloth masks in public places, combined with other public health measures such as hand 
hygiene, can reduce community spread (see Howard et al. 2020). However, given that 
second waves raged in countries such as France, where masks are mandated in public 
places, and Spain, which also has a mask mandate and very high compliance (and where 
both countries implemented such a policy prior to the advent of the second wave) (see 
Felter and Bussemaker 2020), it looks likely that further measures for epidemic control are 
required in addition. 
 
Local lockdowns can work where infections are concentrated in a certain isolated area, but in 
densely populated areas they are likely to suffer from spillover infections from neighboring 
areas. When the virus is dispersed among the population, local lockdowns are only 
effective when all neighboring areas are locked down too (Li, Y. et al. 2020). The 
implementation of local lockdowns under the conditions currently facing many countries is 
likely to lead to a pattern of “repeated surges and falls until such times as the virus has 
eaten its way through all exposed and vulnerable people” (Wise 2020, 1). 
 
Another strategy which has attracted much discussion is the use of immunity passports – 
documents that could allow individuals who have already been infected, and thus built up 
an immunity to COVID-19, to engage in a variety of activities, while restricting the 
movements and activities of others. In Israel, such passports are now available for persons 
who are vaccinated and those who previously contracted the virus and have presumably 
built up natural immunity (Holmes and Kierszenbaum 2021). However, at the time when 
many governments emerged from the first lockdowns, there was insufficient information 
to gauge whether immunity passports might constitute a promising strategy. It was unclear 
what (if anything) might function as a reliable and easily testable correlate to immunity 
(Huang et al. 2020), and whether individuals that have been infected will indeed exhibit 
immunity, and if so, for how long (Deutscher Ethikrat 2020; Grassly et al. 2020). And there 
was reason to doubt that, even if previous infection protects an individual from severe 
symptoms upon reinfection, that it will have an effect on their ability to transmit the virus 




With that, let’s turn to the two strategies that may show promise when implemented in the 
right way; selective isolation of certain vulnerable groups in society, and digital contact 
tracing coupled with immediate quarantine. Although these two measures differ in many 
particulars, they can be viewed as subscribing to the same overall strategy; they both aim to 
replace general lockdowns by increasing the specificity of lockdown measures (targeting only 
a certain subset of the population) while retaining sensitivity (ensuring, to the greatest degree 
possible, that high-risk cases1 are not missed). We will draw this out by looking at each 
strategy in turn. 
2.2 Selective Isolation 
A selective isolation policy involves dividing the population into sections: those particularly 
vulnerable to COVID-19 (sometimes with the additional category of those in close contact 
with this group, like caretakers), and the rest of the population. People in the first (two) 
group(s) are isolated, allowing the rest of the population to go about their lives with fewer 
restrictions (see e.g. van Bunnik et al 2020). Several mathematical models of this broad 
strategy have been produced (e.g. Ferguson et al. 2020; McKeigue and Calhoun 2020; 
Neufeld et al. 2020; van Bunnik et al. 2020; Weitz et al. 2020), and recommendations along 
these lines were implemented in Sweden and the UK during the first wave of the pandemic 
(Hughes 2020; Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare 2020; The Local 2020). This 
broad idea also gained traction for a while in the US, with the release of the Great 
Barrington Declaration, in which a group of prominent epidemiologists and public health 
scientists, among others, suggested a strategy along these lines as an alternative to 
continuing general restrictions (see Kulldorff et al. 2020). As a result of this declaration, 
this strategy was endorsed for a time by the White House (Porter 2020).  
 
These models and policies have tended to focus on people over 70 years old as candidates 
for isolation, as well as people with underlying illnesses, such as diabetes, who have been 
shown to be particularly likely to suffer serious adverse effects from COVID-19 
(Williamson et al. 2020). The aim of this strategy is to prevent the health care system from 
becoming overwhelmed by ensuring that the persons most likely to require hospitalization 
 
1 In the case of selective isolation, “high risk” refers to high risk of adverse consequences in the event of 
infection, and in the case of contact tracing, “high risk” means high risk of already being infected (and thus 
transmitting the virus to others). 
6 
 
do not get infected. This type of policy thus increases specificity of lockdown measures by 
identifying a certain factor that correlates with increased risk, and isolating the segments of 
the population that exhibit this factor. Of course, the cost of this increased specificity is 
decreased sensitivity; there will be people that do not exhibit this risk factor that will suffer 
severe adverse effects of COVID-19, leading to hospitalization and/or death.2 But the 
mathematical models suggested that this policy could achieve sufficient sensitivity to keep 
the numbers of patients that must be hospitalized to manageable levels, provided that 
compliance is sufficiently high, which may have required mandatory rather than 
recommended isolation of the targeted groups (van Bunnik et al. 2020). These policies, 
where implemented, were unsuccessful, particularly in Sweden, where the virus spread 
through aged care facilities, and where residents of these facilities constituted more than 
70% of total deaths. Part of the reason for this was the introduction of the virus into these 
institutions by caregivers (Stern and Klein forthcoming), indicating a need for more 
stringent isolation measures, particularly concerning contact restrictions for caregivers and 
others in close contact with residents from these institutions (the “shielders”, in van 
Bunnik et al.’s (2020) vernacular). 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, it is worth drawing attention to three features of this 
strategy. The first is that it must proceed by targeting certain groups – groups that exhibit 
the factor that puts them at increased risk. We will, in the remainder of this paper, focus on 
the elderly, but our arguments could also be applied to those with underlying diseases. 
Second, this policy will require the extended isolation of the targeted group (van Bunnik et al. 
2020), potentially until an effective treatment or vaccine can be implemented (Savulescu 
and Cameron 2020). Third, this policy aims to prevent the people directly targeted by the 
policy from contracting COVID-19 in the first place. This means that this policy can be, 
and often is, justified on the basis that it protects those who are subject to the most 
stringent restrictions. 
2.3 Contact Tracing 
Another promising measure for increasing the specificity of lockdown measures while 
retaining sufficient sensitivity is a digital contact-tracing app. While the overarching aim of 
reducing the burden on the healthcare system is the same, this policy attempts to identify 
 
2 The inclusion of the third group of caretakers conversely reduces specificity while increasing sensitivity – by 
isolating more people, the risk that those in high-risk groups will be infected decreases. 
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those who are most likely to already be infected, and reduce the risk that they will transmit 
the infection to others by sending them into quarantine. Mathematical modelling studies 
suggested that a digital contact tracing app might be a sufficient means of achieving 
epidemic control, bringing the reproduction number under 1, as long as it exhibits certain 
attributes (Ferretti et al. 2020; Hinch et al. 2020), which most Corona apps that were put in 
place lack. 
 
First, in order to be sufficiently sensitive, digital contact tracing will need to identify likely 
index cases, and alert those who have had high-risk contact with them, quickly 
(Hernández-Orallo et al. 2020; Kretzschmar et al. 2020). Contact tracing apps often operate 
by exchanging Bluetooth signals when two users come into close proximity with each 
other. Because this allows all high-risk contacts to be alerted immediately when an index 
case reports infection (and because it can provide a more complete record than manual 
contact tracing) digital contact tracing has been regarded as a promising mitigation measure 
in the context of COVID-19 (Ferretti et al. 2020; Troncoso et al. 2020). But according to 
the mathematical modelling studies, in order to achieve sufficient sensitivity to prevent a 
general lockdown, such an app would further need to allow users to report infection as 
soon as they experience symptoms of the virus, and these reports would have to result in 
immediate quarantine of their high-risk contacts, rather than, as is the case with many apps 
at the moment, waiting until they receive a positive test result for COVID-19. Requiring 
users to seek a test and receive a positive diagnosis before reporting infection on the app 
introduces delays that will lead to further transmission before contacts can be alerted. 
 
Increasing the sensitivity of this measure in this manner entails a corresponding decrease in 
specificity – eschewing a confirmation requirement will lead to false positives, and thus the 
erroneous quarantine of contacts. This effect can be mitigated, and an appropriate balance 
between sensitivity and specificity reached, by allowing the app to collect some 
pseudonymized information on a central server – a permanent pseudonymous identifier of 
each app user, and a record of the pseudonymous identifiers of contacts. This would allow 
the system to identify likely false positives – if the false positive is followed up with a 
negative test, or if a sufficiently low number of contacts are subsequently infected. This 
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would allow erroneously quarantined app users to be quickly released.3 Additionally, and as 
above, in order to achieve epidemic control, this policy would require high uptake (Hinch 
et al. 2020), potentially necessitating incentivized or even mandatory app use (for 
smartphone users). 
 
In contrast to selective isolation, rather than zoning in on certain groups, a contact tracing 
app isolates users based on their individual movements. Furthermore, this strategy requires 
short periods of isolation. Finally, those who are isolated under this policy are those who are 
likely to already be infected – the aim here is to interrupt the spread of infection, protecting 
others from infection, rather than the individuals isolated. 
 
Having established, based on mathematical modelling, what selective isolation and contact 
tracing strategies would likely need to look like in order to be effective – thus explaining 
why less stringent strategies that were in fact implemented were unsuccessful in curbing the 
spread of the pandemic – we can now proceed to an ethical evaluation of these rival 
strategies. We do so by comparing, first, the ways in which the strategies target the 
respective segments of the population, and second, their aims. 
 
3 Targets 
3.1 Targeting groups 
As we have seen, selective isolation would target a specific group – in particular the elderly 
– by locking down members of that group. This is a case of statistical discrimination, that 
is, taking salient features as proxies for a property of interest – in this case, the propensity 
to develop complications if infected – and treating individuals differentially on this basis. 
But not every differential treatment based on statistical generalizations is a moral wrong, 
for instance, requiring young males to pay higher car insurance premiums is not generally 
regarded as wrongful discrimination. Thus, we should begin by asking, would selective 
isolation wrongfully discriminate against the elderly? 
 
The answer to this question depends on precisely why and under what circumstances one 
thinks discrimination is wrong. Three families of views can be distinguished, each of which 
suggests that this policy should be seen as involving a problematic form of discrimination. 
 




First, on harm-based accounts of discrimination, discrimination is wrong when and 
because it does harm to those targeted. Selective isolation would harm the elderly in two 
ways.4 First, there are the direct effects of prolonged isolation, including, but not limited to, 
potential loss of income, limited opportunities to socialize, and decreased mobility. Second, 
this policy might foster or exacerbate hostile attitudes towards the elderly, for example, that 
they should not be treated as fully autonomous persons, or that they are a drain on societal 
resources. Moreover, if one believes that the wrongfulness of discrimination is 
proportional to the degree to which the individuals discriminated against are already 
disadvantaged – Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2014) has convincingly argued for such a 
prioritarian view of discrimination – selective isolation of the elderly would constitute a 
particularly serious case of wrongful discrimination. This policy would exacerbate the 
disadvantages (e.g. lack of mobility, social opportunities) and stigma faced by an already 
disadvantaged and stigmatized group. 
 
Many accounts, however, root the wrongfulness of discrimination in concerns that go 
beyond harm, by focusing on the meaning expressed by an act of discrimination. 
According to Deborah Hellman, wrongful discrimination is an act by an agent in a position 
of power that demeans the persons who are targeted by that act, in the sense that the act 
conveys the social meaning that those persons are of lower moral status than others (2008; 
2017). What a lockdown of the elderly expresses, according to this view, depends on 
economic, cultural, and historical factors, such that in a society where the elderly are 
generally stigmatized, this policy will express that the elderly are second-class citizens, a 
threat to health care systems, that is best to isolate them from general society, and so on. 
The meaning of this policy would be less problematic in a society in which the elderly were 
generally regarded as equal members of society. Because there is reason to think the elderly 
are in fact a stigmatized group in most Western societies (Richeson and Shelton 2006),5 it 
follows that on the basis of the social meaning expressed by it, a lockdown of the elderly 
would constitute a considerable wrong.6 
 
4 In the next section, we will discuss whether those locked down might also benefit from this policy, and 
whether this could outweigh the types of harm (or other discriminatory effects) discussed here. 
5 The same is true of other groups that are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, such as people with diabetes 
(see Schabert et al. 2013). Thus, while our focus here is on the elderly, our arguments extend to other groups 
that may be subject to isolation policies, too. 
6 Other accounts root discrimination in the meaning that the discriminator attaches to his act, which can 
differ from the social meaning of the act. For instance, according to Larry Alexander, an act is wrong if the 
actor’s beliefs are morally or factually erroneous (1992). But Alexander restricts his analysis to the context of 




The third family of views on discrimination holds that cases of wrongful discrimination are 
intrinsically wrong, over and above the harm that they do to the persons discriminated 
against, and contingent facts, such as stigma of a certain group, that determine social 
meaning. Benjamin Eidelson argues that discrimination is wrong when and because the 
discriminator disrespects those they discriminate against, where this disrespect, in cases of 
statistical discrimination, stems from a failure to treat people as autonomous agents (2015). 
Subjecting the elderly to a policy of isolation, singling them out as unable to make reflective 
decisions concerning how to conduct themselves, amounts to a denial of their capacity to 
act as autonomous agents,7 and would thus wrongfully discriminate against them on this 
account. Sophia Moreau’s view that the violation of an equal right to freedom constitutes 
wrongful discrimination would produce a similar explanation as to why locking down the 
elderly is wrong (2010). 
 
Further nuance might be added to this discussion. For example, some theorists have 
argued that it is particularly pernicious to discriminate against people on the basis of 
characteristics, such as race or sex, that people cannot easily choose or alter (Singer 1983). 
This provides further reason to think that isolating only the elderly is particularly 
problematic, since age is not a voluntarily chosen characteristic. The point of this 
discussion is simply that, while proponents of different accounts of the wrongfulness of 
discrimination might take issue with different aspects of this policy, it seems safe to say that 
they will be united in their agreement that such a selective isolation policy constitutes 
wrongful discrimination.8 
 
raise the question of whether there exists an agent in the relevant policy-making process that can be 
attributed the beliefs that are required for the policy to be discriminatory. Because such an agent might not 
exist in a democratic decision-making process, we omit these accounts. 
7 We will return to this general point in more detail in the subsequent section. 
8 It might be countered that locking down the elderly is not wrongful discrimination on a rather popular view 
on discrimination, according to which discrimination is wrong when it treats individuals in salient groups 
arbitrarily or irrationally (e.g. Schauer 2003). As a selective isolation policy targets the elderly because they are 
particularly vulnerable to the virus, targeting them is not arbitrary or irrational, and such a policy would thus 
not be wrongful discrimination, on such “irrationality”-views. These views, however, do in general not yield 
plausible explanations for why cases of statistical discrimination are wrong. For it is a defining feature of 
statistical discrimination that it is “rational”, in the sense that those salient features are targeted which 
correlate with a property of interest. On an irrationality-view, successful cases of statistical discrimination 
could thus never be morally wrong, which is clearly implausible. 
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3.2 Targeting individuals 
In contrast to selective isolation, contact tracing does not target people on the basis of 
salient features, but is rather based on individual behavior: is an individual likely to have 
had contact with an infected person? This policy would thus not directly discriminate 
against certain, socially salient groups. But it may nevertheless have a disparate impact on 
people in such groups, which could be thought to constitute indirect discrimination. This 
would be the case if the members of a salient group were systematically more likely to be in 
contact with infected persons than other people, and thus more likely to be sent to 
quarantine by the app. There are reasons to think that this is indeed the case. For instance, 
because workers in precarious employment conditions are less likely to work from home, 
while at the same time being more likely to form social ties with workers in similar 
conditions, they may be more likely to be exposed to the virus and to be sent to quarantine 
by the app (Klenk and Duijf 2020). While such hypothesized correlations between salient 
features and likelihoods of being sent to quarantine by the app would require empirical 
confirmation, this kind of concern would not constitute an argument against contact 
tracing. If the virus is disproportionately contracted by workers in precarious employment 
conditions, or by members of some other salient groups, the app is not the source of this 
disparity. Rather, what needs to be tackled are the background conditions that allow a 
situation to occur in which the burdens of the pandemic are disproportionately shouldered 
by people who were already worse-off before. For instance, these conditions could be 
mitigated for workers in precarious employment, by providing adequate on-the-job safety 
to avoid infection, as well as job protection and compensation in case they do get infected.9 
But if someone does get infected, they should be quarantined, whether they are in 




9 Measures of this kind will be needed regardless of the policy response adopted. Women and minority 
workers have been put in a particularly precarious position due to the pandemic, and are disproportionately 
affected by general lockdown conditions. Minorities are also disproportionately likely to die from COVID-19 
(see Fawcett Society et al. 2020), making the absence of effective measures highly problematic from this 
standpoint. 
10 It might be argued that if people in some salient groups are more likely to contract the virus, not only will 
the app report more true positive cases among these groups, but also more false positives. In response, we 
emphasize that in the system that we have envisioned in the previous section, false positives will be 
quarantined for short periods of time only and will be released from quarantine quickly. In this way the 
damage done to them can be reduced. An effective contact tracing app could also do more to mitigate the 
disproportionate harm caused by disproportionate infection rates. Again, the key here will be putting 
adequate protective measures in place to mitigate the negative effects of holding precarious employment 
during a pandemic. 
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The focus on individuals, rather than on groups, is preferable when it comes to 
discrimination. But focusing on the characteristics of individuals when determining whom 
to quarantine brings with it a different set of concerns. These are the much-emphasized 
concerns about privacy, which have dominated the discussion of the use of contact-tracing 
apps since its inception. A chief concern here is that data gathered by these apps could be 
misused to surveil citizens (see Troncoso et al. 2020). This focus has led to the popularity 
of so-called “decentralized” contact-tracing apps, where all individual information is stored 
on the individual’s own smartphone. We have argued, however, that in order to bring the 
epidemic under control without sacrificing specificity, an effective contact-tracing app will 
need to store some (pseudonymized) information about individual users on a central 
server. Could such a measure be ethically justifiable? 
 
It should first be noted that most of these concerns are not peculiar to a digital system that 
stores users’ pseudonymous identifiers. For manual contact tracing, as it is currently 
practiced in many countries, also generates data that allow health authorities to identify the 
contacts of infected persons. Unlike those generated in an app, these data are not 
pseudonymized and could thus potentially be misused more easily. This highlights the need 
for effective legislation concerning all contact-tracing methods, preventing information 
gathered in this manner from being used for non-public health purposes such as law 
enforcement or immigration control (e.g. New York State Senate 2020). 
 
Critics of centralized systems have noted a further potential problem, namely that the 
server hosting the pseudonymous identifiers might be hacked. However, as cryptographers 
have pointed out, neither centralized nor decentralized systems are immune to potential 
breaches (Ahmed et al. 2020; Vaudenay 2020). It has also been noted that hacking the 
central server and revealing users’ identities to malicious actors would likely require a 
government authority to collect information when users register on the app, and that 
breaches revealing users’ identity are generally easier to conduct in decentralized systems 
(Vaudenay 2020). This is because in a decentralized system, when someone reports an 
infection, their phone uploads an ephemeral identifier to a central server, which other 
phones in turn download from the server. This makes it possible for any tech-savvy user to 
track other users’ identifiers and then compare them with the downloaded identifiers, thus 
identifying infected users. Centralized apps, in contrast, can be better protected against 
attacks, leading some cryptographers to suggest that privacy-conscious users would rather 
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report an infection in a centralized system, and empirical evidence suggests that this is 
indeed the case (Li, T. et al. 2020). What this discussion of privacy concerns shows is not 
that the envisioned system is problem-free, but rather that many existing forms of contact 
tracing (both manual contact tracing, and decentralized contact-tracing apps) are no less 
problematic, and furthermore that these problems can be mitigated through adequate 
design, legislation, and supervision. 
 
Summing up the comparison between the two kinds of policies, we have found selective 
isolation to constitute problematic direct discrimination against the elderly. Might this 
nevertheless be a justifiable means of avoiding a general lockdown, as Julian Savulescu and 
James Cameron (2020) have argued? No, because there is another viable option, digital 
contact tracing, that does not directly discriminate against members of socially salient 
groups. While it is possible that contact tracing might have disproportionate effects on 
some socially salient groups, the root of this problem can be traced to the background 
conditions that have led to the costs of the pandemic being unfairly distributed, and must 
be ameliorated by tackling these background conditions directly (as will be necessary no 
matter what pandemic-mitigation strategy we adopt). Furthermore, while contact tracing as 
envisioned here raises privacy concerns, these are not exclusive to this policy, but are rather 
common to all contact-tracing efforts, and they can be dealt with through adequate 
regulation (see White and van Basshuysen forthcoming). Because these problems are 
surmountable, contact tracing appears, at this stage, to be a preferable alternative means of 
avoiding a general lockdown. 
4 Aims 
However, there might be a potential saving grace of a selective isolation policy, or more 
specifically, an alternate way in which it might be justified. As outlined in section 2, a 
crucial difference between the two policies is that selective isolation aims to intervene before 
the targeted group is infected. A contact tracing app, on the other hand, imposes isolation 
on the targeted group after infection. Though both might constitute effective ways to 
prevent the healthcare system from inundation, selective isolation can also be justified on 
the grounds that it protects those directly affected by the policy – by protecting them from 
infection and the potential serious consequences. Indeed, this justification is central to the 
policies and documents advocating the selective isolation of the elderly (Hughes 2020; 
Kulldorff et al. 2020; Savulescu and Cameron 2020; Swedish Ministry for Health and Social 
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Affairs 2020; van Bunnik et al. 2020). Given that there is a potential personal benefit to 
submitting to selective isolation, could this make the policy justifiable? Should this cause us 
to revisit our earlier contentions about the discriminatory effects of the policy? There are 
two problems with this justification, when employed in support of selectively isolating the 
elderly: first, rather than mitigating the discriminatory implications of the policy, it may in 
fact exacerbate them, and second, it is doubtful that selective isolation should indeed be 
straightforwardly regarded as benefiting those isolated. Let’s consider these problems in 
turn. 
 
Concerning the discrimination-exacerbating effects, let us assume, for the time being, that 
the protective effects of selective isolation should lead us to construe isolation as a benefit 
for those isolated. Even if this is the case, this justification would exacerbate the 
wrongfulness of the discrimination on at least two of the families of accounts we looked at 
above. This is comes out most clearly when we look at social meaning accounts of 
wrongful discrimination. Remember that according to Hellman, discrimination is wrong 
when it is demeaning, expressing that the person affected by a policy is not of equal moral 
worth (Hellman 2017). To isolate the elderly on the grounds that this is what’s best for 
them, effectively denying them a chance to determine what is in their own best interests, 
while leaving others free to make these decisions for themselves, is to treat the elderly as if 
they in particular do not have the capacity to make their own self-regarding decisions. 
Being treated as if you are not able to make your own self-regarding decisions is 
“demeaning”, and expresses that the individuals targeted by this policy “do not have the 
standing normally accorded to an adult member of society” (Scanlon 1999, 253).  
 
Furthermore, it reinforces the problematic and already widespread assumption that elderly 
people do not have the capacity to make their own decisions (Regan 1981). Basically, 
insofar as a selective isolation policy is espoused on the grounds that it will protect the 
people that will be isolated, it amounts to paternalism, often seen as problematic because it 
exhibits an attitude of disrespect towards the agent (see Davis 2017). When a class of 
people is treated as if they are uniquely unable to make their own decisions, this conveys a 
demeaning attitude towards this group, and exacerbates any existing stigma concerning 
their moral worth and capacity to participate as full-standing members of society. This type 
of justification will clearly also be problematic if one subscribes to a disrespect-based 
account of the wrongfulness of discrimination (along the lines of Eidelson). Even if one 
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accepts that selective isolation is a benefit to those isolated, the deployment of this 
paternalistic justification for the policy exacerbates its discriminatory impact according to 
both of these accounts. 
 
It is less clear, however, whether the same conclusion follows if one regards discrimination 
as wrong if and because it harms those discriminated against. On such a view, whether the 
protection-based justification would exacerbate or mitigate the wrongness of selective 
isolation depends on the question of how harm is constituted. In a “multi-dimensional” 
conception of harm, the specific way in which a discriminatory policy harms those 
discriminated against is a stand-alone wrong, and even if this policy were also to benefit 
those discriminated against (by protecting them), this benefit could not make up for the 
harm that it imposes (lack of social and financial opportunities). On such a conception, 
selective isolation is wrongful discrimination on account of the harm that it does, 
independent of the benefits that it might imply.  
 
In contrast, if one regards harm as one-dimensional – as Lippert-Rasmussen does (2014, 
167) – selective isolation would cease to be wrong if its benefits were to exceed its harms. 
We will argue below that it is doubtful that selective isolation policies can plausibly be 
construed as benefitting the isolated, so that the justification of selective isolation on 
grounds of their alleged benefits fails on harm-based accounts, even if harm is regarded as 
a single dimension that could in principle be neutralized by benefiting those that are 
harmed.11 Note, moreover, that many of the features exacerbating the wrong of selective 
isolation on other accounts of discrimination, such as the demeaning signification, or lack 
of respect, may impose additional harm on the people targeted by these policies, and would 
thus also exacerbate the severity of the discrimination on harm-based accounts (no matter 
if harm is seen as modular or one-dimensional). 
 
 
11 A harm-based account that regards harm as a single dimension, such as Lippert-Rasmussen’s, has the 
general implication that wrongful discrimination can be evaded if the victims of a discriminatory policy are 
compensated for the harm they suffer as a result of the discrimination. Thus, in the case of selective isolation, 
assuming there is a way of valuing the harm that this policy does to the people isolated, they could be paid the 
same value in money, so that the lockdown policy would cease to be a case of wrongful discrimination on this 
account. It would however not be a convincing strategy to defend selective isolation by promoting this policy 
combined with simultaneous compensation of those isolated for the harm they suffer from their isolation. 
After all, any discriminatory act could be defended along these lines if one adheres to such an account, but it 
would be implausible to argue that any discriminatory act would cease to be wrongful if only its victims were 
compensated. Rather, this implication should be seen as an idiosyncratic (and perhaps problematic) artifact of 
this harm-based account. 
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Before we turn to this claim about the benefits of selective isolation, it should be 
emphasized just how the paternalistic justification of selective isolation differs from 
arguments for contact tracing. Contact tracing, as we have noted, targets people that are 
already likely to be infected with the coronavirus. The purpose of quarantine is to protect 
others, rather than self-protection. It is well accepted that interfering with a competent 
individual’s freedom of choice is problematic and demeaning when the action is self-
regarding – but when actions are other-regarding, restrictions on freedom do not have the 
same demeaning connotations. Although consent is widely regarded as necessary for 
interventions in medical ethics, when it comes to public health ethics, which deals with 
other-regarding issues such as the spread of infectious disease, coercive and compulsory 
measures are seen as sometimes justifiable (Pugh and Douglas 2016). As we have seen, 
however, self-protection is not the only potential justification for selective isolation. This 
can also be justified on other-regarding grounds – if too many elderly people become 
infected, they will use a disproportionate amount of medical resources, which could 
compromise the care of others that become infected. Our point here is just that insofar as 
this policy (as it so often is) is justified on the grounds that it will protect those affected, it 
exacerbates the demeaning and disrespectful implications of this policy. 
 
But let’s put aside, for a moment, the demeaning implications of this type of paternalistic 
justification. If it really confers a significant benefit on those directly impacted, perhaps 
these discriminatory implications might pale in comparison (or perhaps one subscribes to a 
one-dimensional account of harm and a harm-based account of discrimination, and thus 
thinks that significant benefits should lead us to no longer regard this policy as 
discriminatory). Should we see the impact of this policy as involving such a benefit for 
those isolated? There are two reasons that the benefit for the individuals isolated is far 
from clear. The first is that although elderly people are much more likely than those in 
younger demographics to experience serious complications as a result of contracting 
COVID-19, the vast majority of those over 70 who do become infected will not experience 
serious complications. Only about 18.4% of those over 80 who contract the virus need to 
be hospitalized. For 70-79 year olds, the proportion is 16.6% (Verity et al. 2020). The fact 
that most of those that must be isolated would not in fact suffer serious harm as a result of 
contracting the virus weakens the case that this can be justified on the basis of the benefit 




The second reason is that the prolonged isolation that this policy requires in order to 
function adequately can take a severe toll on mental health, and leads to the loss of valued 
opportunities, such as the ability to interact face-to-face with friends and family. It is just 
not clear here that the reduced risk of infection straightforwardly constitutes a benefit, 
given the high price that must be paid. Even if we accept that freedom of movement may 
indeed be justifiably restricted for these individuals’ own good, the case that this does 
indeed constitute a benefit is not sufficiently strong here. This a prime example of a 
situation in which individuals must be free to decide for themselves what is in fact in their 
own best interest, and to act accordingly. Here, we have arrived at the second classic anti-
paternalist argument – that individuals are in the best position to decide for themselves 
what constitutes a benefit, given their privileged knowledge of their own preferences and 
values. Where the benefit is so uncertain, and where what amounts to benefit is so 
dependent on what the individual prioritizes and values, the case for paternalism here is 
fatally weakened. 
 
Again, this objection targets the policy only insofar as it is justified on the grounds that it is 
in the affected individuals’ best interests. But it should be noted here that the burdens 
placed on the targeted group are more severe than under contact tracing in virtue of their 
duration – contact tracing and quarantine would, in contrast, only subject targeted 
individuals to short periods of quarantine, spanning from days to a couple of weeks.   
These considerations suggest that the selective isolation policy cannot gain additional 
justification on the grounds that it is in the best interests of those upon whom the most 
stringent measures are inflicted. The case that it is indeed in the best interests of the 
individuals affected is weak, and this justification could in fact exacerbate problems of 
discrimination by treating the elderly in a demeaning manner, suggesting that they are 
unable to make self-regarding decisions about their own wellbeing. 
5 Conclusion 
Over one year after its initial outbreak, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to rage, and the 
long term outlook, despite vaccination campaigns, remains uncertain. Could we have 
avoided the severe second and third waves sweeping much of the globe, and the need for 
further damaging general lockdowns? We have identified two strategies, selective isolation 
and digital contact tracing, that attracted significant attention during the first stages of the 
pandemic. As there was evidence that each strategy, if implemented in a different and 
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significantly more stringent form to what we saw in practice, could achieve this, the 
question of whether either of these policies would have been ethically viable comes to the 
fore. We have argued, first, that the way in which selective isolation policies target salient 
groups, in particularly the elderly, constitutes wrongful discrimination. The contact tracing 
strategy exhibits an advantage here, as it does not discriminate against salient groups. While 
it might detect infection patterns that may be seen as unjustly disadvantaging certain salient 
groups, this should not be attributed to contact tracing, but rather to the background 
conditions that allow such infection patterns to evolve. Furthermore, while the 
individualized targeting of the app raises privacy concerns, we have argued that these can 
be mitigated.  
 
Second, we canvassed a prominent justification of selective lockdown policies, namely that 
they aim to protect those directly impacted by the policy, an aim not shared by a contact-
tracing app, which targets individuals for quarantine because they are already likely to be 
infected. We have argued, however, that this justification fails to support this strategy, but 
rather exacerbates its discriminatory nature, and that it rests on the assumption that 
extended isolation constitutes a benefit for the isolated, which cannot be established with 
sufficient clarity to provide any justification. 
 
It follows from this appraisal of the benefits and drawbacks of the two available strategies 
that the contact tracing option is ethically preferable to selective isolation. This does not 
mean that this strategy is problem-free – contact tracing raises privacy concerns, which 
should be taken seriously. But, unlike the severe discrimination that selective isolation 
involves, contact tracing does not by design violate ethical norms; rather, we have argued 
that potential privacy violations could be diminished through adequate design, legislation 
and supervision. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us the necessity of swift and 
uncompromising action and adequate preparation in formulating policy responses that can 
provide a means of avoiding the devastating consequences of the unchecked spread of 
infection, or of ongoing lockdowns. A reflection on the options that showed promise in 
the early stages of the pandemic, particularly concerning their ethical viability, may help us 
to prepare for future, similar situations. As new variants of the COVID-19 virus emerge, 
and vaccination campaigns face various hurdles that may not allow them to deliver the 
swift relief initially anticipated, we may also need to think about how to emerge from 
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